Power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: evidence from the Armenian dairy sector by Gorton, M et al.
  
RVC OPEN ACCESS REPOSITORY – COPYRIGHT NOTICE 
 
This is the peer-reviewed, manuscript version of the following article: 
Gorton, M., Angell, R., Dries, L., Urutyan, V., Jackson, E. and White, J. (2015) 'Power, buyer 
trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy sector', 
Industrial Marketing Management, 50, 69-77. 
The final version is available online via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.05.024.        
© 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. 
The full details of the published version of the article are as follows: 
 
TITLE: Power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian 
dairy sector 
AUTHORS: Gorton, M., Angell, R., Dries, L., Urutyan, V., Jackson, E. and White, J. 
JOURNAL TITLE: Industrial Marketing Management 
VOLUME/EDITION: 50 
PUBLISHER: Elsevier 
PUBLICATION DATE: June 2015 (online) 
DOI: 10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.05.024 
1 
 
 
Power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: 
evidence from the Armenian dairy sector 
 
Matthew Gorton1, Robert Angell2, Liesbeth Dries3, Vardan Urutyan4, Elizabeth 
Jackson5 and John White6  
 
1 Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, UK. matthew.gorton@newcastle.ac.uk  
 
2 Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. angellrj@Cardiff.ac.uk  
 
3 Wageningen University, The Netherlands. liesbeth.dries@wur.nl  
 
4 ICARE Armenia and Texas A&M University, USA. vardan@icare.am  
 
5 Department of Production & Population Health, Royal Veterinary College, 
Hatfield. eljackson@rvc.ac.uk  
 
6 Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK. 
john.white@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
 
Corresponding author: Dr. Matthew Gorton, Newcastle University Business 
School, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE. Tel: 01912081576. 
Email: matthew.gorton@newcastle.ac.uk  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Data were collected as part of an EU INTAS project (Grant No. EAST/WEST–6928), 
with the analysis undertaken as part of COMPETE, a research project supported 
by the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (Contract No 312029). We thank 
three anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  
2 
 
 
Power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: evidence from the 
Armenian dairy sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper presents a Multiple Indicators and MultIple Causes (MIMIC) model for 
explaining the relationships between buyer-seller power, buyer trustworthiness and 
supplier satisfaction / performance. The model draws on an organizational supply chain 
perspective of power and is verified using data relating to dairy farmers’ relationships 
with their main buyer in Armenia. The analysis indicates that buyers are more 
trustworthy where there is greater competition for supplies. Buyer trustworthiness is 
also positively correlated with both the size of a supplier, as well as a supplier being a 
member of a marketing cooperative. Buyer trustworthiness has a positive impact on 
suppliers’ satisfaction (regarding their relationship with their main buyer) and enhances 
the quality and quantity of suppliers’ output. 
Keywords 
 
Buyer-seller relationships, power, trust, supplier performance, Armenia.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The nature of buyer-supplier relationships has long been recognized as a factor 
influencing business performance. Early work on supply chain management (e.g. 
Spekman, 1988, p. 78) regarded collaboration between firms in a supply chain as being 
built on a “win-win” model. However, this ignores how asymmetries in power affect 
the distribution of outcomes (Hingley, 2005a), particularly in explaining why buyers 
and sellers often enter into relationships for which they do not desire long-term mutual 
benefits and ‘have no qualms about “win-lose” scenarios’ (Cox, 2004b, p. 411). Power 
asymmetry has thus become an important topic within supply chain research (Nyaga, 
Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013). This recognizes that less powerful actors may be 
vulnerable to opportunism with power asymmetry amplifying the potential for conflict 
and disaffection (Nyaga et al., 2013).  
Previous studies investigate the effect of power asymmetry between buyers and 
suppliers on: relationship trust (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002; Kumar, Scheer, & 
Steenkamp, 1995), relationship strength (Maloni & Benton, 2000), relationship 
orientation (Ganesan, 1994), supplier responsiveness (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002), 
supplier performance (Benton & Maloni, 2005), and relationship satisfaction (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005). Such studies typically consider the relationships between a small 
number of variables / constructs with single measures of power asymmetry so that 
‘future research could develop a more in-depth assessment of power asymmetry 
measures and examine how perceptions of power use and their implications differ at 
different levels of asymmetry’ (Nyaga et al., 2013, pp. 59-60). The first contribution of 
this paper is thus to introduce a more comprehensive model, incorporating five 
dimensions of relationship power, as well as buyer trustworthiness, supplier satisfaction 
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and supplier performance. For this a Multiple Indicators and MultIple Causes (MIMIC) 
model is developed and verified using data on Armenian milk producers’ (farms) 
relationships with their main buyer (e.g. dairy processors). MIMIC models, which are 
underutilized in the literature on buyer-supplier relationships, are suited to this task 
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008), including, in this case, a set of manifest 
(directly observable) variables (measures of buyer-supplier power) which impact on a 
latent variable (trust), which, in turn, impacts on another set of manifest variables 
(satisfaction and supplier performance).  
While numerous studies acknowledge asymmetric power in contemporary 
supply chains, there is less agreement on what should be the response of the actors 
concerned and policy makers. One viewpoint is that weaker partners have to accept and 
learn to live with the imbalance of power, recognizing that they have limited room for 
maneuver (Hingley, 2005b).   Others seek to identify strategies for improving the 
position of weaker actors (i.e. sources of countervailing power) in buyer-seller 
relationships (Etgar, 1976). The second contribution of this paper is to assess the extent 
to which membership of a marketing cooperative can improve a buyer’s trustworthiness 
by providing countervailing power to suppliers. While the theory of countervailing 
power is long established (Galbraith, 1954), with a recognition that marketing 
cooperatives may act as a mechanism for achieving this (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002), 
empirical evidence remains scarce.  The latter may reflect that the generic literature on 
buyer-supplier relationships overwhelmingly draws on manufacturing and retail cases, 
where marketing cooperatives are relatively uncommon, rather than agriculture which 
has a far stronger tradition of cooperative buying and selling (Jang & Klein, 2011).  
Considering the potential role of marketing cooperatives as a source of countervailing 
power is important for policy makers who seek to improve the fortunes of small-scale 
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producers within supply chains characterized by increasingly concentrated and 
powerful downstream actors (FAO, 2014a).  
Finally, while the literature on power and trust in buyer-supplier relations is 
extensive, to date it draws overwhelmingly on data and examples from North America 
and Western Europe (Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008) so that many important 
regions of the world remain under-studied. There is thus a need to extend research to 
other locations, considering the determinants of constructs such as trust in emerging 
economies, which may have far higher levels of opportunistic behavior (Burgess & 
Steenkamp, 2006). The third contribution of the paper addresses this and the call of 
Cannon, Doney, Mullen, and Petersen (2010) for the examination of buyer trust and 
supplier performance in a wider range of different geographical contexts. 
The Armenian dairy sector is an exemplary case for investigating the 
relationships between asymmetric power in buyer-seller relationships, buyer 
trustworthiness and supplier performance as it is characterized by sufficient variance in 
these variables for robust modelling. The dairy industry requires close relationships 
between producers and manufacturers given the highly perishable nature of the good, 
the flow of production (twice daily milking) and typically daily collections (Bijman, 
2012; Dries, Germenji, Noev, & Swinnen, 2009). As in most emerging and transitional 
economies, Armenian dairy processors confront a supply base characterized by 
suppliers that vary significantly in size with a large number of small-scale producers, 
which are generally poorly capitalized. The Armenian sample analyzed in this paper 
records a mean herd size of 13.36 cows, with 50% of farms having eight cows or fewer 
and an average yield of 2,246 kg per milking cow. Worldwide there are 122 million 
dairy farms, with a mean herd size of 3 cows and an average yield of 2,100kg per 
milking cow (IFCN & ICARE, 2013). In China, the world’s fastest growing and third 
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largest dairy market, the average herd size is 6.7 cows with a mean yield of 2,282 kg 
per milking cow (FAO, 2014b). In the EU, the mean herd size and yield is higher (34 
cows and 7,068 kg respectively), but this masks important variations with some New 
Member States having much smaller-sized operations, for example in Romania the 
mean herd size and yield is 6 cows and 3,917 kg respectively (European Commission, 
2013). Armenia thus shares many characteristics of dairy sectors in other emerging and 
transitional economies, enhancing the applicability of the analysis to other regional and 
national contexts. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
 
The quality and quantity of a manufacturer’s output is highly dependent on the 
capabilities and performance of its suppliers (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Specifically, 
previous research identifies that supplier performance depends on the actions of both 
buyers and sellers (Maloni & Benton, 2000), the balance of power in the buyer-supplier 
dyad (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Kumar et al., 1995) and the degree of relationship trust 
(Meehan & Wright, 2012).  The model depicted in Figure 1 seeks to capture the 
associative relationships between buyer-seller power, buyer trustworthiness, and 
supplier satisfaction / improvements in output performance (quality & quantity of 
supply). The remainder of this section briefly reviews the literature on power and trust 
and details how they are conceptualized in this paper, before justifying each hypothesis 
in turn. 
 
Figure 1 here 
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The literatures on power and trust are both large and multidisciplinary. 
Pinnington and Scanlon (2009) identify three main viewpoints on power: personal, 
social, and organizational supply chain perspectives. The literature on personal power 
derives from French and Raven (1959) and later amendments (Raven, 1993), and 
identifies six bases of power: reward, coercion, legitimate, expert, referent, and 
informational. These bases vary in terms of the necessity of surveillance and social 
dependence. French and Raven’s (1959) approach informed much early research on 
supply chain relationships (e.g. Hunt & Nevin, 1974) but has been criticized for 
associating power with control and having an undue focus on the negative, subjugating 
connotations of power with no recognition of mutuality (Pinnington & Scanlon, 2009). 
The social power literature focuses on the sources and application of power in relation 
to social groups, drawing on the insights of Foucault (1977). For the latter, the self is a 
constructed identity that implicates us in our subordination to a regime of power. This 
paper adopts the third, organizational supply chain approach to power (Cox, 2004a; 
Cox, Ireland, Lonsdale, Sanderson, & Watson, 2002).  
The organizational supply chain approach assumes that power in buyer-seller 
relationships depends on the relative strategic significance and the availability of 
alternatives (scarcity) to the resources that are exchanged between the two parties (Cox 
et al., 2002). Power thus depends on the relative positions of each actor, it is not an 
absolute concept, and emerges from the specific context of the relationship. This 
implies that actors behave and interact with others differently, depending on their 
relative power sources.  
Regarding how actors exercise their power, this paper follows the logic of 
Kumar et al. (1995). The latter draws on bilateral deterrence theory to explain the 
relationship between buyer-seller power and trustworthiness. They argue that the 
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likelihood of opportunistic behavior is reduced where power between a buyer and seller 
is symmetric as the stakes each has in the relationship, the costs of conflict and dangers 
of a retaliatory strike are similar. However, increasing asymmetry reduces the 
impediments to the more powerful firm acting opportunistically as it has less need to 
be cooperative, trustworthy or committed (Kumar et al., 1995). The greater the relative 
power of a buyer vis-à-vis a supplier, therefore, the less likely the former is to be 
trustworthy. Following Doney and Cannon (1997, p. 36) trust is defined for the purpose 
of this study as ‘the perceived credibility and benevolence of a target of trust’. Buyer 
trustworthiness therefore refers to the extent to which a supplier perceives its primary 
buyer as reliable (credible) and interested in the supplier's best interests (benevolent) 
(Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
It is proposed that buyer trustworthiness depends on five dimensions of the 
relative power of buyers and suppliers, which following the logic of Cox (2001) capture 
the relative strategic significance and scarcity of resources exchanged between the two 
parties. Specifically these are: the potential number of other commercial buyers 
realistically available to the supplier (x1), the ease with which the supplier can switch 
to a different main buyer (x2), the ease with which the buyer can replace the supplier 
(x3), the size of the supplier (x4), and whether the supplier is a member of a marketing 
cooperative (x5).  The first four measures capture substitutability, scarcity and the 
attractiveness of the supplier’s resources (Cox et al., 2002; Ramsay, 1996) while 
membership of a marketing cooperative is considered as a potential mechanism for 
providing suppliers with countervailing power (Galbraith, 1954). Buyer trustworthiness 
is assumed to influence suppliers’ satisfaction, and stimulate improvements in the 
quantity and quality of a supplier’s output.   
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Based on the model presented in Figure 1, eight hypotheses are proposed and 
the rationale for each is detailed in turn.  
 
2.1 The number of potential buyers 
The number of potential buyers for a supplier’s output varies across markets. The most 
restrictive case is a monopsony (single buyer). With a monopsony, the buyer can act 
opportunistically with suppliers remaining highly dependent on that buyer owing to a 
lack of alternatives. As such, power resides almost entirely with the buyer (Cox et al., 
2002). In markets where a seller faces a large number of potential buyers, the level of 
dependency is lower (Christopher, 2011), so that if the buyer acts opportunistically, it 
risks the danger of the seller terminating the relationship. In the case of a monopsony, 
the seller has no alternatives, however, so for the buyer the danger of conflict and 
retaliatory action by the supplier is weak (Kumar et al., 1995). This implies that: 
H1: The potential number of commercial buyers for a supplier’s output positively 
influences buyer trustworthiness. 
 
2.2 Suppliers’ switching ability 
The ability of a supplier to switch to another buyer depends on more factors than simply 
the number of potential buyers. For the seller, switching costs are the expenses 
associated with changing from one buyer to another. Three types are commonly 
acknowledged: (i) transaction costs, (ii) learning costs, and (iii) artificial or contractual 
costs (Klemperer, 1987). In a B2B context, transaction costs have received most 
attention (Williamson, 1983), namely the costs of searching for, negotiating, 
monitoring and enforcing a business relationship. To meet the requirements of a 
particular buyer, a seller may have to invest in relationship specific assets, which have 
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little value outside of that specific relationship (high asset specificity). Such 
investments are an important form of switching cost, which may tie a supplier to a 
particular buyer (Heide & John, 1988; Williamson, 1983). Consequently, when supplier 
switching costs are high, power typically rests with the buyer (Cox, 2004a) so that 
suppliers are ‘captive’ (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). High switching costs 
therefore increase the likelihood that opportunistic behavior on the part of the buyer 
goes unpunished by the seller (they do not exit the relationship), so that: 
H2: The difficulty of a supplier switching to another main buyer negatively influences 
buyer trustworthiness. 
 
2.3 Buyers’ substitutability of suppliers 
The ability of a buyer to switch to a different supplier affects the balance of power.  In 
a market characterized by numerous suppliers possessing similar capabilities, the 
balance of power is tilted towards the buyer (Cox, 2004a). There is empirical evidence 
for this: in the pharmaceutical market competition between suppliers, with a high 
degree of substitutability between them in the case of generic drugs, is critical for large 
buyers to obtain more favorable terms (Ellison & Snyder, 2010). The more generic the 
suppliers’ output, the less the substitution of suppliers influences a buyer’s goals and 
outcomes, making switching decisions between suppliers less risky. A negative 
association between the ease with which a supplier can be substituted and buyer 
trustworthiness is therefore proposed: 
H3: The ease with which the buyer can substitute the supplier negatively influences 
buyer trustworthiness. 
 
2.4 Size of supplier 
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Research on agri-food markets suggests that buyers prefer to maintain relationships 
with a small number of larger suppliers rather than a mass of small-scale producers 
(Fearne & Hughes, 2000; Hingley, 2005a).  The former reduces transaction costs 
(particularly negotiation and monitoring costs), yields economies of scale and typically 
gives the buyer greater control over the offering (Christopher, 2011; White, 2000). This 
logic has underpinned the rationalization of the global agri-food supply base, with the 
marginalization and exclusion of some small-scale producers from restructured supply 
chains (Van Der Meer, 2006). Larger suppliers are thus of greater strategic importance 
to buyers than smaller counterparts (Kähkönen & Virolainen, 2011). Ceteris paribus, 
the buyer should consequently value a relationship with a larger producer to a greater 
extent than with a smaller one, so that:  
H4: The size of a supplier positively influences buyer trustworthiness 
 
2.5 Membership of a marketing cooperative 
Galbraith (1954) refers to countervailing power as the mechanism by which power 
evolves between buyers and sellers. He argues that the motive for countervailing action 
emerges where power is asymmetric, so that weaker parties are impelled to cooperate 
with others in a similar position for their own protection and with the hope of capturing 
some of the gains of the currently stronger actor(s). Galbraith (1954) acknowledges a 
number of potential mechanisms for realizing countervailing power, citing, as an 
example,  the emergence of European consumer cooperatives in the face of oligopolistic 
producers. Global agri-food markets are characterized by increasing concentration at 
processing and retail levels (Dobson, Waterson, & Davies, 2003), while most branches 
of agricultural production, in contrast, remain characterized by family farms and 
relatively fragmented production (Allen & Lueck, 1998). Several studies of agri-food 
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supply chains thus identify power being skewed toward downstream buyers (e.g. 
Bourlakis & Weightman, 2004; Fearne & Duffy, 2004; Hingley, Lindgreen, & 
Casswell, 2006; Simons, Francis, Bourlakis, & Fearne, 2003; Touboulic, Chicksand, & 
Walker, 2012). In this environment, individual farms lack bargaining power so that 
collective action between suppliers becomes an attractive option (Hendrikse & Bijman, 
2002). Marketing cooperatives are one form of collective action, which may generate 
countervailing power with membership decreasing the likelihood of buyer 
opportunism. This is because any loss in supply from a collective group of sellers would 
be more damaging to the buyer than the termination of a relationship with a single 
seller. In other words, the strategic importance to the buyer of a collective group of 
suppliers is greater than that of a supplier independently (Kumar et al., 1995), so that : 
H5: A supplier’s membership of a marketing cooperative positively influences buyer 
trustworthiness. 
 
2.6 Supplier satisfaction 
Satisfaction in a buyer-seller context can be defined as ‘a positive affective state 
resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another 
firm’ (Lam, Shankar, Erramilli, & Murthy, 2004, p. 295). Ganesan (1994) argues that 
trustworthiness and satisfaction are related in that actors are more likely to be 
dissatisfied with a relationship in which the other party acts opportunistically and is 
perceived to be untrustworthy. Such exploitative relationships generate feelings of 
anger and resentment (Ganesan, 1994). Conversely, a relationship in which actors are 
concerned about one another’s welfare engenders satisfaction. This can be 
hypothesized as: 
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H6: Buyer trustworthiness positively influences supplier’s satisfaction with the 
relationship with their main buyer. 
 
2.7 Improvements in suppliers’ production quantity and quality  
Handfield and Bechtel (2002) conceptualize that trust in a buyer-supplier relationship 
is positively associated with supplier responsiveness. They argue that suppliers ‘go out 
of their way (beyond contractual agreements)’ for trustworthy buyers (Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002, p. 373) and present supporting empirical evidence. Similarly, Gow and 
Swinnen (2001) contend that buyer trustworthiness increases supplier responsiveness. 
They explain this by drawing on theories of private contract enforcement, reasoning 
that in markets characterized by high levels of buyer opportunism suppliers will be less 
willing to make relationship-specific investments. However, if a buyer is perceived to 
be trustworthy, a supplier will be more confident about investing. This is particularly 
the case when the buyer pays on time (Gow & Swinnen, 1998). Investment by suppliers 
is likely to be critical, positively impacting on their performance, especially in markets 
characterized by undercapitalized firms with deficiencies in both the quantity and 
quality of output (Swinnen & Vandeplas, 2010). This suggests that: 
H7: Buyer trustworthiness positively influences improvements in suppliers’ production 
quantity. 
H8: Buyer trustworthiness positively influences improvements in suppliers’ production 
quality. 
 
3. Overview of Armenian dairy farmer – milk buyer relationships 
 
By the end of the Soviet era, there were around 1,000 sovkhozy (state farms) and 
kolkhozy (collective farms) in Armenia specializing in milk and meat production. 
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Collectively these farms maintained approximately 800,000 cattle and supplied 40 
relatively large-scale and over 100 small-scale milk processing facilities. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the dairy sector suffered as real incomes declined. The 
volumes of dairy goods produced by the former sovkhozy and kolkhozy, which were 
privatized in the mid-1990s, dropped from 130,000 to about 5,500 tons per year. Most 
ceased to function and were partially replaced by more than 150,000 micro dairy 
‘farms’ which became the main suppliers of raw milk supplying a population for 
Armenia of 3 million people (Alpha Plus Consulting & DAI 2003).  
From 1995 onwards the dairy sector started to recover. A few privatized dairy 
processors restarted production, albeit at much reduced volumes. Many new small 
plants emerged, largely producing cheese often with inadequate food safety systems. 
Outside of the capital city, Yerevan, home-made products largely dominated 
consumption (Urutyan, 2009). 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided significant 
financial, technical and marketing support to revitalize the Armenian dairy sector.  The 
USDA Marketing Assistance Project (MAP) ran from 1992 until 2005. It issued around 
328 loans totaling $11 million to new or expanding agribusinesses (Urutyan, 
Aleksandryan, & Hovhannisyan, 2006). USDA MAP and later the Center for 
Agribusiness and Rural Development Foundation (CARD), a spin-off organization of 
MAP, contributed to the development of the dairy sector by helping processors to 
modernize their equipment and apply good manufacturing practices and by supporting 
the establishment of milk marketing cooperatives and milk collection centers in many 
villages.  
By 2012 there were around 180,000, mostly small, dairy farms in Armenia 
although there are some relatively large farms with more than 70 cows each (IFCN & 
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ICARE, 2013). The total dairy herd was 303,000 cows in 2012 (Table 1) with almost 
50% of the produced milk delivered to dairy processors. The rest was used on farm and 
within the household. Milk yields per cow are about 30% of the EU average (Eurostat, 
2012). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
In autumn 2013 there were 70 dairy processors operating in Armenia, none of 
which were foreign owned. Not all processors provide prompt payments to milk 
producers (Urutyan, 2009). In Armenia, farmers or cooperatives do not own a 
processing company, and usually their relationship with dairy processors is based on 
informal contracts. Cooperative - dairy processor relationships emerged in the early 
2000s after USDA MAP introduced a development program which established more 
than 30 milk marketing cooperatives. Marketing cooperatives possess cooling tanks and 
storage facilities (mostly donated), which enable them to continuously procure milk 
from farmers.  
 
 
4. Model Operationalization 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
As the focus of the study is dairy farmer – milk processor relationships, sampling was 
restricted to primary producers who sell cows’ milk. Consequently, those farmers 
without dairy cows or who did not sell any of the milk produced were excluded from 
the study. The sample was constructed to achieve a representative cross-section of 
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commercial dairy farms, agricultural companies and household producers (providing 
they marketed at least some milk).  
Respondents were drawn from Armenian regions (marzes) with significant 
commercial milk production. Quotas, in proportion to the region’s share of national 
output, were selected (Table 2). Data collection occurred thus in all regions apart from 
Yerevan City, Armavir and Vayots Dzor where milk production is of minor importance 
(collectively less than 10% of national output). Respondents were identified using a 
combination of sources, namely: local and regional authorities, agricultural agencies, 
local livestock experts and village mayors. In total, the sample comprised 300 useable 
responses. Data collection occurred via face to face interviews, conducted on-farm, 
using a standardized questionnaire.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
4.2 Variable Measurement 
Appendix A details the measures used to operationalize the MIMIC model. The 
construct buyer trustworthiness is based on Doney and Cannon’s (1997) scale of trust 
(y1 - y7), which has been applied and verified extensively in the context of buyer-
supplier relationships (Ivens, 2005; Terawatanavong, Whitwell, Widing, & O'Cass, 
2011; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011). As discussed above, five formative 
variables captured each of the dimensions of relative power between buyers and 
suppliers, namely: the supplier’s estimate of the potential number of other commercial 
buyers for their milk (x1), the perceived ease with which the supplier can switch to 
another main buyer (x2), the perceived ease with which the buyer can replace the 
supplier (x3), number of milking cows as a measure of supplier size (x4) and whether 
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the supplier was a member of a milk marketing cooperative (x5). The number of milking 
cows is the most commonly used measure of the size of dairy farm operations (Foltz, 
2004). The three endogenous indicators were supplier satisfaction (SAT) and measures 
of the degree to which the relationship with the main buyer was perceived to have 
improved the quantity of output (QNT) and product quality (QLT). All questions 
referred to the supplier’s relationship with their main buyer. 
 
Appendix B lists the means and standard deviations for all of the variables 
included in the research model. The minimum and maximum values are also provided 
for each of the continuous measures. A correlation matrix is reproduced in Appendix 
C. The tables in Appendices B and C confirm the suitability of variables in the model 
and the standard deviations do not reveal any restrictions in range across measures 
(Winklhofer & Diamantopoulos, 2002). The exception to this was the supplier size 
variable, which was positively skewed. Consequently, as discussed below, we based 
analysis of this variable on estimation techniques known to counteract issues of 
multivariate normality (MVN). 
4.3 Buyer Trustworthiness: Construct Specification and Modification 
Prior to specifying the MIMIC model, an exploratory factor analysis in SPSS 21 using 
varimax rotation revealed that the seven items for the reflective component of the buyer 
trustworthiness construct loaded on a single factor with an acceptable level of internal 
consistency (α = .75) (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). Further, this 
same construct was specified within the Mplus 7.0 package using the more restrictive 
confirmatory factor analysis framework (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The initial model 
yielded a reasonable fit to the data as denoted by conventional standards outlined in the 
literature (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012; Hu & Bentler, 1999) (χ2 = 38.97, df = 14, p<.01; CFI = 
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.94; TLI = .91; RMSEA = .07). However, closer inspection of the standardized 
estimates (Table 3) revealed that two reflective items in the buyer trustworthiness scale 
(Trust2 and Trust6), both with reverse order scales, had low factor loading scores 
(<.50), compromising convergent validity, and making them candidates for deletion 
(Iacobucci, 2010). The use of reversed-scaled items in creating unidimensional 
constructs for structural equation modeling has long been considered as problematic, 
despite the benefit of reducing acquiescence bias (Herche & Engelland, 1996). To 
improve the measurement properties of the construct (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) these 
two items were removed. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Following these initial checks, the MIMIC model for the buyer trustworthiness 
construct, with formative covariates and consequences, was specified and each 
hypothesis assessed.  
 
4.4 MIMIC Model  
Robust maximum likelihood (MLR) in Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), known 
for its lower sensitivity to deviation from multivariate normality (Chou, Bentler, & 
Satorra, 1991), was selected to estimate the model. The main difference between the 
MIMIC and (aforementioned) measurement model was the inclusion and specification 
of five formative variables representing the dimensions of power (i.e. the potential 
number of other commercial buyers, supplier’s switching ability, buyer’s ability to 
substitute the supplier, supplier size and supplier membership of a marketing 
cooperative), as well as three consequences (supplier satisfaction, perceived 
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improvement in suppliers’ production quantity, perceived improvement in suppliers’ 
production quality). The resulting model had a reasonable model fit (χ2 = 87.30, df = 
52, p<.01; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .05). The selected covariates account for 
22% of variation in buyer trustworthiness, with the latter explaining 32% of the 
variance in supplier satisfaction, 37% of perceived improvements in suppliers’ 
production quantity and 38% of perceived improvements in suppliers’ production 
quality. 
 
Next, we evaluated specific relationships (i.e. standardized paths) between 
variables in the model (Table 4). It is worth noting that each of the covariates (formative 
indicators) has a statistically significant effect on the endogenous construct (buyer 
trustworthiness). The number of potential other commercial buyers (x1) has a positive 
effect on buyer trustworthiness confirming H1 (β = .12; p=.05). From the total sample, 
9.7% indicated that they had no other potential commercial buyers for their milk, with 
an average of 2.03 other commercial buyers reported (see Appendix B). A significant 
proportion of suppliers thus have no alternative marketing options (monopsony) but 
this is not universally the case. 
 
Switching ability (x2) (β = -.31; p<.01) and buyer substitution (x3) (β = -.25; 
p<.01) has a negative effect on trustworthiness supporting H2 and H3. Consequently, 
as it becomes easier to be replaced as a supplier and, the difficulty of switching to 
another buyer increases, levels of buyer trustworthiness correspondingly decrease. As 
the size of a supplier (x4) increases, buyer trustworthiness also increases (β = .11; 
p=.05). H4 is therefore accepted. Finally, membership of a marketing cooperative (x5) 
is associated with higher levels of buyer trustworthiness (β = .21; p<.01), so that H5 is 
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accepted. The model also supports each of three hypothesized consequences of buyer 
trustworthiness (H6, H7, H8). As such, when buyer trustworthiness increases, so do 
supplier satisfaction (β = .57; p<.01), suppliers’ production quantity (β = .61; p < .01) 
and suppliers’ production quality (β = .61; p <. 01).  
 
Table 4 here 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Drawing on an organizational supply chain perspective of power and Kumar et al.’s 
(1995) application of bilateral deterrence theory, this paper presents a novel model of 
the relationships between buyer-supplier power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier 
satisfaction / performance. All hypotheses are accepted and the findings verify the 
viability of the framework.  
The results support a key tenet of the organizational supply chain perspective 
(Cox, 2001, 2004b; Cox et al., 2002), namely that the execution of power in buyer-
seller relationships depends on the relative positions of each actor. Specifically, buyers 
are perceived to be more trustworthy where there is greater competition in the buyer’s 
market, i.e. where there are more alternative buyers that a supplier can choose from and 
when it is easier for suppliers to switch to them. The analysis also shows that greater 
buyer trustworthiness has a significant, positive effect on suppliers’ satisfaction with 
the relationship and their performance both in terms of output quantity and quality. This 
supports the notion that high levels of buyer opportunism curb suppliers’ willingness 
to ‘go the extra mile’ (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002, p. 373) or make investments (Gow 
and Swinnen, 2001), and thus acts as a brake on improvements in the quality and 
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quantity of suppliers’ output. Such an outcome thus impedes attempts to improve 
productivity and international competitiveness.   
 
5.1 Managerial implications 
For suppliers, the results reveal three strategies to improve their relative power 
and position vis-à-vis buyers: grow in size, positively differentiate themselves from 
other suppliers in a way in which is beneficial to buyers so that they are less easily 
substitutable, and / or join a marketing cooperative. Generally, larger suppliers are of 
greater value to buyers, lowering transaction costs, particularly when the supply base 
is very fragmented. In the case of milk, being highly perishable, bulky and costly to 
transport, it is size relative to other suppliers on the domestic market which matters as 
there is minimal international trade in fresh milk. For goods which can be procured 
across borders, relative size on the international market will be more important. 
The second strategy for suppliers to improve their position vis-à-vis buyers is to 
reduce the degree to which they can be substituted by competitors. This involves 
differentiating themselves from other suppliers in a way in which is valued by the buyer 
and not easily copied by others. Regarding the form of differentiation, it would be best 
for the supplier to look at attributes that are valued by a number of buyers. If suppliers 
differentiate themselves in a manner which is valued only by their current main buyer, 
it would increase their dependence on the latter and involve risky, relationship-specific 
investments.   
Thirdly, for managers, the analysis demonstrates the benefit of joining a 
marketing cooperative as a solution for curbing buyer opportunism where suppliers 
individually lack power. In the Armenian case, milk buyers have generally been 
supportive of attempts to stimulate marketing cooperatives as a way of reducing 
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transaction costs given a fragmented supply base. In other cases, when production is 
less fragmented, buyers may be more wary of dealing with marketing cooperatives as 
the benefit to the buyer of lower transaction costs can be more than offset by the extra 
rents accrued by suppliers acting collectively. 
Finally, many treatments of power recommend that parties maximize their 
power over other actors. Being the most powerful actor does bring enormous 
advantages and these should not be ignored or downplayed (Hingley, 2005b). However, 
if the power imbalance toward buyers is so great, supplier trust in that buyer is 
compromised and the former will be reluctant to invest in a relationship in which they 
are so vulnerable. This hurts improvements in supplier performance. Thus, in some 
regards, high power imbalance can be counterproductive, particularly where the buyer 
seeks to stimulate improvements in the quality and quantity of suppliers’ output. Buyers 
that forego some of the potential to exploit a favorable power imbalance in the short-
term may yield long-term benefits in supplier performance. 
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
The results demonstrate that competition policy matters not just for downstream 
customers but also that monopsonies can be detrimental to suppliers. In the Armenian 
case the number of other commercial buyers available to a supplier is a significant 
determinant of buyer trustworthiness. Other research demonstrates that the lack of 
alternative buyers also depresses the prices received by suppliers for their output and 
can lead to the latter being charged vastly inflated fees for inputs provided by buyers 
(Perekhozhuk, Glauben, Teuber, & Grings, 2014; Sadler, 2006; Sauer, Gorton, & 
White, 2012). An effective competition authority which breaks up monopsonies will 
improve the situation of small-scale suppliers, whose welfare, in an environment of 
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weak social safety nets, tends to depend heavily on the returns to their output. At the 
same time as improving suppliers’ position, breaking up monopsonies also improves 
downstream (consumer) welfare (Perekhozhuk et al., 2014). Small-scale producers are 
often ignorant of the prices and services received by their counterparts and in such an 
environment there is a case for a publically funded market information service (Sadler, 
2006; Shepherd, 1997). To be successful the latter should be combined with an effective 
competition policy which breaks up monopolies and monopsonies. 
Second, the results support initiatives to establish marketing cooperatives. This 
has been a policy objective in Armenia, financially supported by USDA MAP (Cocks, 
Gow, & Dunn, 2003), as well as in the EU (Bijman, 2012) and some other emerging 
economies (FAO, 2014a). Marketing cooperatives have the potential to strengthen the 
bargaining power of farmers as well as reduce transaction costs and improve the 
coordination of operations (Bijman, 2012). However in practice, marketing 
cooperatives have not always delivered these benefits (Bhuyan, 2007). Establishing and 
maintaining a marketing cooperative demands effective leadership and recognition of 
the importance of ‘people’ related factors (Bhuyan, 2007; Bijman, 2012). This requires 
attention from both domestic policy makers and international donor programmes, 
particularly for capacity building and managerial and organizational assistance. There 
is a clear rationale for educating farmers about the benefit of marketing cooperatives 
and using successful cases to demonstrate what can be achieved. 
In the context of Armenia, as in much of Central and Eastern Europe, a further 
complication for extending the role of marketing cooperatives is related to the Soviet 
legacy and farmers’ negative perceptions of kolkhozy. In Armenia, most farmers 
confuse marketing cooperatives with former kolkhozy (Urutyan, 2009). Moreover, even 
if they become a cooperative member, farmers often fail to realize the ideas behind 
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marketing cooperatives, namely user-control, user-benefit, and user-ownership. These 
problems are not insurmountable (Cocks et al., 2003) but require integrated policy 
support that aids cooperative decision-making (governance and accounting), 
understanding (education and training), and upgraded production practices (traditional 
agricultural extension).  
 
6. Limitations and future research 
 
The MIMIC model presented has been verified with data for Armenia. While this 
country’s dairy sector shares many of the characteristics of agri-food markets in other 
emerging and transitional economies, testing the model in other contexts is warranted. 
Ideally, replication studies should involve the collection of data from more than one 
point in time to better capture the evolution of buyer-supplier relationships and evaluate 
the importance of length of relationships.  
In the model presented, in keeping with organizational supply chain 
perspectives (Cox et al., 2002), power is assumed to be based on the relative position 
of buyers and sellers within a specific dyad. There may be other sources of power that 
affect the degree of buyer trustworthiness; for example, political connections and links 
to organized crime. These are not captured in the study and may be difficult for 
researchers to measure in an accurate, verifiable manner. 
The results establish that marketing cooperatives can provide countervailing 
power and curb buyer opportunism. However, their establishment has often proved 
problematic.  Case study research considering successful and unsuccessful marketing 
cooperatives, particularly in emerging and transitional economies, could generate 
insights into how they can be best managed, for instance regarding rules governing 
membership entry and exit, internal decision-making and how best to structure 
25 
 
collective bargaining with buyers. Such research would generate practical lessons to 
guide the management of new and established marketing cooperatives. 
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Table 1: Armenian Dairy Sector Indicators, 2008-2012 
 
  Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of cows 1,000 head 283 274 273 283 303 
Production of milk 1,000 tons 662 616 601 602 618 
Average milk yield per cow kg 1992 2027 2035 2127 2039 
Average fat content % 3.8 3.75 3.77 3.79 3.79 
Average protein content % 2.93 2.94 3.03 3.02 3.02 
Milk delivered to processors 1,000 tons 310 264 225 241 324 
Household / on farm use 1,000 tons 352 352 376 361 294 
 
 
Source: IFCN and ICARE (2013) and NSS (2013a) 
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Table 2: Quota sampling plan 
Milk production  by region Proportional 
sampling 
Final sample 
 ‘000 
tonnes 
% of 
total 
  
Yerevan City 2.2 0.4 1 0 
Aragatsotn 76.5 12.4 37 20 
Ararat 38.2 6.2 19 23 
Armavir 37.4 6.0 18 0 
Gegharkunik 116.3 18.8 56 57 
Lori 77.7 12.6 38 39 
Kotayk 53.5 8.7 26 20 
Shirak 101.5 16.4 49 71 
Syunik 57.2 9.3 28 60 
Vayots Dzor 21.1 3.4 10 0 
Tavush 36.6 5.9 18 10 
Total 618.2 100.0 300 300 
Source: NSS (2013b) and survey data 
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Table 3: Reflective Measurement Model for Buyer Trustworthiness 
 
 Standardized 
Coefficient (β) 
S.E
. 
Sig. 
 (p-
value) 
Trust1 (y1) 
 
.70 .04 .00 
Trust2 (y2)*
✚ 
 
.49 .06 .00 
Trust3 (y3) 
 
.65 .05 .00 
Trust4 (y4) 
 
.65 .05 .00 
Trust5 (y5) 
 
.65 .05 .00 
Trust6 (y6)*
✚ 
 
.44 .06 .00 
Trust7 (y7)* 
 
.64 .05 .00 
*Reverse-scaled item; ✚Loading set to zero in final measurement model
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Table 4: MIMIC Model – Antecedents & Consequences 
Model No.  Standardized Coefficient (β) S.E. Sig. (p-value) 
Model 1 Covariates   .00 
Direct Effects No. Commercial Buyers (x1) .12 .06 .05 
 Switching Ability (x2) -.31 .08 .00 
 Buyer Substitution (x3) -.26 .07 .00 
 Supplier Size (x4) .11 .06 .05 
 Membership of mkt coop (x5) .21 .06 .00 
 Consequences    
 Buyer TrustworthinessSupplier Satisfaction .57 .05 .00 
 Buyer Trustworthiness Production Quantity .61 .05 .00 
 Buyer Trustworthiness Production Quality .61 .05 .00 
Fit Statistics: χ2 = 87.30, df = 52, p<.01; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .05   
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Appendix A: Variable operationalization for MIMIC model 
 
Formative Variables: Dimensions of Relative Supplier – Buyer Power 
No. Commercial Buyers (x1) Supplier estimate of potential number of other commercial 
buyers for their milk 
 
Switching Ability (x2) Ease of which supplier can switch to another main buyer. 5 
point scale where 1 = very easy and 5 = very difficult 
 
Buyer Substitution (x3) Ease with which buyer perceived as being able to replace 
supplier. 5 point scale where 1 = very difficult and 5 = very 
easy 
 
Supplier Size (x4) Number of milking cows of productive age 
 
Cooperation (x5) Membership of milk marketing cooperative. Dummy 
variable where 1 = member and 0 non-member 
 
Latent Variable  
Buyer trustworthiness 7 item scale of trust derived from (Doney and Cannon 
(1997)). Likert scale, where 1 = strongly agree and 5 = 
strongly disagree. The specific items are: 
(y1): Our main buyer keeps the promises it makes  
(y2): Our main buyer is not always honest with us (RS)* 
(y3): Our main buyer is genuinely concerned that our 
business succeeds 
(y4): When making important decisions, our main buyer 
considers our welfare as well as its own 
(y5): We trust our main buyer keeps our best interests in 
mind 
(y6): We find it necessary to be cautious with our main 
buyer (RS)* 
(y7)Our main buyer is trustworthy  
 
Endogenous Indicators 
 
Supplier satisfaction (SAT) Overall supplier satisfaction with their relationship with 
their main buyer. 5 point scale, where 1 = very dissatisfied 
and 5 = very satisfied 
 
Production Quantity (QNT) “Being able to sell to our main buyer has improved 
production quantity”, Likert scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree 
 
Production Quality (QLT) “Being able to sell to our main buyer has improved 
production quality”, Likert scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree 
 
* RS= reverse scaled 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics for Variables included in the Model 
 
Variable Mean S.D Min. Max. 
Trust1 (y1) 4.08 .78 1 5 
Trust2 (y2) 3.93 1.07 1 5 
Trust3 (y3) 3.85 .76 1 5 
Trust4 (y4) 3.44 .93 1 5 
Trust5 (y5) 4.27 .64 2 5 
Trust6 (y6) 2.95 1.14 1 5 
Trust7 (y7) 3.76 1.04 1 5 
No. of other commercial buyers (x1) 2.03 1.87 0 20 
Switching Ability (x2) 2.16 .97 1 5 
Buyer Substitution (x3) 2.80 1.05 1 5 
Supplier Size (x4) 13.36 8.55 3 100 
Membership of mkg. co-op (x5) NA NA NA NA 
Satisfaction (SAT) 4.02 .73 2 5 
Production Quantity (QNT) 3.80 .98 1 5 
Production Quality (QLT) 3.63 .88 1 5 
Note: x5is a binary variable. 
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Appendix C: Correlation Matrix 
 (y1) (y2) (y3) (y4) (y5) (y6) (y7) (x1) (x2) (x3) (x4) SAT QNT QLT 
Trust1 (y1) 
 
1.00              
Trust2 (y2) 
 
.47** 1.00             
Trust3 (y3) 
 
.32* .28** 1.00            
Trust4 (y4) 
 
.44** .32** .51** 1.00           
Trust5 (y5) 
 
.51** .39** .42** .39** 1.00          
Trust6 (y6) 
 
.28** .24** .25** .35** .23** 1.00         
Trust7 (y7) 
 
.42** .39** .38** .35** .37** .33** 1.00        
No. Commercial 
Buyers (x1) 
-.03 .04 -.04 .08 -.10 .11 -.05 1.00       
Switching Ability 
(x2) 
-.16* -.07 -.24* -.18* -.11 -.12* -.19* .32** 1.00      
Buyer Substitution 
(x3) 
-.09 -.16* -.29* -.25* -.18* -.07 -.12* .07 .18** 1.00     
Supplier Size (x4) .08 .07 .09* .12* .10 .08 .02 .14* .09 -.11 1.00    
Satisfaction (SAT) .38** .30** .32** .37** .14* .21** .35** .09 -.12* -.29* .09 1.00   
Production Quantity 
(QNT) 
.37** .28** .43** .41** .36* .25** .34** .05 -.24* -.14* .14* .30** 1.00  
Production Quality 
(QLT) 
.38** .33** .46** .40** .36* .22** .35** .09 -.19* -.11 .12* .39** .56* 1.00 
Note: x5 not included 
 
